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HUMAN RIGHTS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS,
AND DIVINE COMMANDS
Ton van den Beld

The principal question which I set out to answer is whether, since moral
rights and obligations stand or fall together, the latter can stand, that is,
whether they are real and inescapable. The argument initially unfolds as a
rmming comment on the development of Bernard Williams's moral thinking. The reason is that his thought nicely exemplifies an interesting connection between a particular religious and moral scepticism. A first conclusion
is that a morality of real, inescapable and -for the agent-sometimes costly
obligations and their correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic
metaphysic, fits in badly with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second
conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project, which is
neutral towards theism and atheism, fails to give a satisfying account of such
obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory succeeds where non-theistic and atheistic accounts
seem to founder.

Introduction
Richard Rorty's 1993 Oxford Amnesty Lecture on human rights is perhaps
the most challenging work on human rights to have appeared in a long
time. In it he rejects the idea of human rights being based one way or another in human nature. There is no knowledge of human nature, nor of
any other kind that philosophers like Plato, Aquinas, and Kant hoped to
get, to support human rights. In fact human rights are altogether without
foundations.! Yet Rorty acknowledges his pride in being part of the human rights culture, his pride being no more external to his self than is his
"desire for financial or sexual success." But his pride and his being part
of the human rights culture are contingent matters. They are beyond the
reach of justification. He happens to be in favour of that particular culture. His sentiments have been manipulated, like those of his students, in
such a way that he and they can imagine themselves in the shoes of the
despised and oppressed. Thus, Rorty avers: "The more youngsters like
this we can raise, the stronger and more global our human rights culture
will become."2
Rorty's support of the human rights culture reminds us of his backing
of Western liberal democratic ideas in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.
Here too the arguments are avowedly circular, part of a new vocabulary
which happens to convince people. "There is," says Rorty, "no neutral,
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non circular way to defend the liberal's claim that cruelty is the worst thing
we do, any more than there is a neutral way to back up Nietzsche's assertion that this claim expresses a resentful, slavish attitude .... We cannot
look back behind the processes of socialisation which convinced us twentieth century liberals of the validity of this claim and appeal to something
that is more 'real."'3
I must confess that I have a somewhat divided mind with regard to
Rorty's position on human rights. In my secular, naturalist musings I feel
drawn to a Rortyan, sceptical view of moral rights. How could there be,
within the confines of a neo-Darwinian, naturalist view of the world, anything beyond the modern, Western rights vocabulary? I am perfectly willing to disregard the use made of it by "relentless fat egos" (Murdoch's
phrase) claiming their rights to work, paid vacations, the enjoyment of art
and, ultimately, their right to happiness. Let us rather take the decent and
compassionate people who claim for near or distant strangers their right
to be granted asylum and immigration status in order to be protected from
persecution and starvation. Yet, what is there to their claims other than a
contingent narrative which one might hope to be rhetorically effective? Of
course, if such rights have been recognised by a well-organised political
community, there is something beyond the vocabulary. Then the rights are
founded in and are derivable from laws and regulations administered by
a capable government. But when those rights lack the support of enforceable laws and regulations, what remains is a more or less effective vocabulary. The best that moral philosophers, working within a Rortyan naturalist philosophical framework, seem to be able to do is influence people's
attitudes so as to expand their altruistic, compassionate sentiments.
On the other hand-and now the other soul dwelling in my breast,
shall I say my 'real' self, is speaking-I am deeply worried about such
scepticism regarding the status of human rights as moral-as distinct
from legal-rights. To overcome it, my proposal is to seriously consider
reintroducing God into morality. My proposal will take the form of an
argument, but not of a compelling kind, of course. Nevertheless, it is more
than a mere suggestion which you can take or leave.
Before I proceed, a preliminary point must be made. I assume that the
most important rights are claim rights. It seems a reasonable assumption.
Anyway, it is these rights which are the topic of my paper. If strangers
have moral rights, then others-let us say we Westerners-have moral
obligations. 4 So if there are no moral obligations, there are no moral rights,
and a fortiori no moral rights of strangers. I am inclined to agree with the
correlativity thesis, that is, roughly, the idea that moral obligations and
rights mutually imply each other. However, it is obligation that is historically and metaphysically the more basic notion.
Moreover, since, generally, rights are benefits and obligations are burdens, it is psychologically easier to claim the benefits of rights than to take
on the burden of the obligations implied by them. I shall therefore deal
with a moral rights scepticism only indirectly. My argument is levelled
primarily at a scepticism towards what Bernard Williams has called "the
peculiar institution of morality" in which moral obligations have pride
of place. Moral rights stand or fall with moral obligations. The principal
question, therefore, is whether the latter can stand.
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The argument will initially unfold as a running comment on the development of Williams's moral thinking. The reason is that his thought nicely
exemplifies an interesting connection between a particular moral and religious scepticism. A first, tentative conclusion will be that a morality of
real, inescapable and sometimes for the agent costly obligations, and their
correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not
seem to go together with a metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. Then I shall
tum to Korsgaard in order to inquire whether her moral theory, which
seems to be neutral towards theism and atheism, succeeds in giving an
account of such obligations and rights. My second conclusion will be that
her project, however impressive, has failed. The final conclusion of my
paper will be that a theistic account of moral obligations, and of their correlative rights, might succeed where non-theistic and atheistic accounts
appear to founder.
The Relation between Religious and Moral Thinking:
The Case of Bernard Williams

We owe to Williams a splendidly terse reason for the dismissal of the
claim that morality is dependent on theistic religion: any appeal to God in
morality "either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing."5
It is interesting to note, however, that Williams himself appears not fully
to support the independence thesis. In his early Morality, from which the
thesis originates,6 Williams is mainly interested in moral motivation. He
is opposed to a dichotomy of the moral and the prudential. He acknowledges a real distinction between morality and self-interest (71). But this
does not imply that the moral and the prudential exclude each other.
Moral motivation need not be exempt from prudential considerations
(74,76). What is more important to my purposes is that, according to Williams, the distinction is not exhaustive. There is a plurality of considerations to motivate us to do things of a desirable kind without these being
'moral' or 'prudential' in a strict Kantian sense. Religious considerations
such as love of God belong in this category (p. 77). I think Williams is
right here. Religion does not necessarily add the wrong thing to morality, at least not if one is prepared to give up a narrowly moral, Kantian
perspective and is willing to admit the affections into the moral domain.
Religious attitudes are indeed a powerful source of morally good and
praiseworthy behaviour?
Williams, however, goes a step further. He acknowledges that a person's relation with God not only can provide him with moral motivation,
but also might enable him to see his moral obligations as stemming from
that particular relation. Apart from the problem of its intelligibility, the
God-man relationship might function as an acceptable foundation of moral requirements (pp. 77-78). Again, I agree with Williams. But the criticism
of the 'God adds nothing to morality' position should go deeper. There is
a hidden assumption that morality is literally self-supporting. No theistic
base is needed for a morality such as Williams has in view, that is a morality of overriding obligations. This presupposition is doubtful.
At the time when Williams wrote his Morality, the controversy between prescriptivists and descriptivists was rampant. But Hare's variety
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of utilitarianism based on the logic of moral concepts and relevant facts 8
turned out to be no more convincing than Sidgwick's earlier intuitionist
variety. How could morality"s felt authority and binding force be derived
from a person's prescriptive use of its concepts? On the other hand, one
of the leading descriptivists of the time, Philippa Foot, came to view the
requirements of common morality as no more than hypothetical imperatives the binding force of which depended on a person's contingent concern or care for the moral life. For Foot, a morality of inescapable, costly
moral obligations became one possibility among others which depended
on a person's motivational set. 9 A few years later, Mackie's error theory
roused moral philosophers from their metaphysical slumber. First-order
morality with its oughts and ought-nots presupposed a normative reality.
An ought-to-be-ness seemed somehow to be built into the fabric of the
world to the effect that moral requirements 'would be action-directing absolutely, not contingently ... upon the agent's desires and inclinations.t]o
However, according to Mackie, this cannot be so. In the light of what we
know, through science, of the world, this moral realist view has to be rejected as being false. But note that Mackie acknowledged that such a moral realism could be at home iln a Platonic or theistic worldY I shall come
back to Mackie presently in the course of my sketch of the development
of Williams's thinking on the relation between morality and religion.
It is clear from his publications that Williams is familiar with the Christian religion. In an early piece of work he confesses himself to be a religious sceptic, not a believer.12 But he knows what Christianity is about:
"Something must be believed, if religious activities are not just to be whistling in the dark ... and something that connects God with the world of
men." One of the candidate domains where God and men could be related
is the moral world. Williams's problem with the Christian faith is that it is
at least partly incomprehensible, and therefore difficult to accept as trueY
At the time of Morality his position on religion appears to be in essentials
the same, that is scepticism on the basis of incomprehensibility.14 But, as
we have seen, there is no denial of the possible relevance of Christian theism to morality.
Things have changed considerably by the time of the publication of his
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. The change is not revolutionary nor does
it represent a break. It looks more like an evolution of his earlier thought.
Let us take theism first. His initial religious scepticism turns out to have
developed into atheism. Williams is prepared to recognise that if God exists, then arguments about him are of cosmic importance. But since God
does not exist, he can have no impact on moral theory, for example in the
form of a divine command theory, nor on moral practice (apart from the
false beliefs of religious practitioners)P
Now, I want to draw attention to a parallel development that is discernible in Williams's thinking about 'the institution of morality.' Criticisms of
'morality systems' with their emphasis on obligation, such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, are already notable in his early publications. ln But his
scepticism concerning moral obligations with their claim to overridingness borders on outright rejection in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. No
argument is at hand, according to Williams, to convince us of the power
of our psychological capacities to intuit moral truth or, alternatively, to
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frame universal rules of action which bind the will. There is an essential
asymmetry between theoretical and practical reasoning. The latter, unlike
the former, is unavoidably done from the first-person point of view, with
an eye to this person's contingent wants and desires, concerns, and cares.
It does not convert the reflective person necessarily into a being whose
fundamental interest lies in the harmony of the interests of all, a harmony
which can be established through the discovery of and compliance with
universally valid moral obligations. Besides, and this is more than a casual
observation, no authoritative entities like God or Reason are around to
guide or pressure a recalcitrant will into this harmonyY
So there is reason enough to downplay the importance of a morality
system in which moral behaviour is primarily regulated by obligations.
Even if they are still believed to be universally binding and overriding,
they cannot withstand the test of reflection and the system is bound to
be undermined. It is at this point that Williams objects to Mackie's aforementioned 'error theory.' Although critical of particular details, Williams
rejects not so much the theory as Mackie's claim that our first-order moral
convictions need not be upset by the recognition that the phenomenology
which gives rise to them is false. 1s He is willing to admit that in one respect
the morality system is able to survive reflection: "We could recognize it as
something that is necessary to have around."19 The system secures reliability the absence of which would make life perhaps not nasty, brutish and
short, but at least much more uncomfortable. However plausible this may
be, there is no reason to assume that moral obligations have priority in
an individual's deliberation. The categorical 'must' need not be connected
with morality at all. It might be derived from all kinds of personal projects
and relations in which one is emotionally and affectively engaged. 20
A telling detail of the development of Williams's interconnected religious and ethical views is his turning to classical Greek ethical thought as
expressed in tragedy. His explorations on this topic are avowedly under
the influence of Nietzsche. 2! As we know, Nietzsche was profoundly dissatisfied with the culture of his time dominated as it was by Christianity. Kantian morality, according to Nietzsche, was a poor expression of
rather than an alternative to it. But however critical he was of the Christian religion, Nietzsche saw sharply that giving up on God would bring
in its course the loss of truth, obligation and confidence. Let me give
one characteristic quotation: "How greatly we should like to exchange
the false assertions of the priests that there is a God who requires right
action from us ... who loves us and seeks the best for us in all our misfortune-how greatly we would like to exchange these false assertions
for truths which would be just as salutary, reassuring and beneficial as
those errors. But there are no such truths."22 At this particular point too,
Williams seems to have learnt from Nietzsche, or at least seems to be basically in agreement with him. There is no denying that his later thought
reveals a Nietzschean connection. 23
The Prima Facie Transparency of a Religious Theory of Moral Obligation

Why did I draw this admittedly short and rough sketch of the development of this particular piece of Williams's thinking? First of all, since
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Williams knows what Christian theism is about, it is possible for a thinker from a fairly orthodox milieu to identify with him, if not completely
then at least to a certain extent. I not only see the logic of his intellectual moves, but also can imagine myself making them. Like the young
Williams, I am not prepared to accept a non-realist and non-cognitivist
interpretation of the Christian faith along Wittgensteinian and Braithwaitean lines. If true, it has to do with the relation between a really existing person-like being and the world, especially the world of human
beings. If God exists, his existence is indeed of cosmic importance and it
is not far-fetched to believe that it is of some consequence for our view of
reason and value in general and of morality in particular. Furthermore,
the case of Williams shows what implications taking leave of God might
have for one's moral thinking. The consequences I have in mind are of a
logical rather than a psychological nature. There is a rationale underlying them. Let me explain.
Christine Korsgaard has developed the idea of a transparent ethical
theory, transparency being a prerequisite for its success. Transparency
involves a particular relation between the theory's explanatory and justificatory adequacy. A theory is explanatorily adequate only if it gives
an account of a person's doing the morally right thing which is satisfying from the third-person point of view. But the explanation might
undermine the justification and motivation which the person in question has for doing the right thing. In that case, the theory is lacking in
transparency. Note that in order to be transparent it is not enough that
the explanation of the person's action must still hold when he understands himself completely in terms of the theory. He might, for example, continue to fulfil obligations which are costly to him even though
he believes that an evolutionary theory is true, but his action would no
longer be justifiable for him. It somehow would be irrational. To count
as transparent, the ethical theory must be one that allows us to act in
the full light of what morality is and why we are susceptible to its influences, and at the same time to believe that our actions are justified and
make sense. 24
Now consider a father of five in wartime Holland who was asked to
shelter a Jewish child-a stranger in her own country-from transportation to a concentration camp and likely death. He took the girl into his
family and saved her life. He did so because he deemed it to be his inescapable obligation which he traced back to the will of God whom he
trusted and loved. Some sixty years later a philosopher reflects on the
case in the light of Korsgaard's idea of a transparent ethical theory. The
explanation of the father's action is not in terms of biological or social
science; it is of a metaphysical nature. But the metaphysical account does
not undermine its justification. On the contrary, it lends support to it, as
we shall see.
"Obligation comes from law," says Korsgaard-upholding a long
tradition-and "law is the bidding of a superior." The father, versed in
biblical rather than philosophical literature, could have agreed. The law
(of God) had a central place in his deliberations about what he morally
ought to do. Secondly, according to Korsgaard, supernaturally revealed
knowledge of God's will is not necessary for the knowledge of our moral
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obligations. Again the father would not have objected. He knew from
Paul's epistle to the Romans (chap. 1) that non-believers as well as believers are able to know God's will through reason if not through Scripture.
Thirdly, Korsgaard avers, sanctions need not be the motive for obeying
the sovereign will. If they were, morality could not be distinguished from
prudence, nor moral laws from mere counsels. Morally obligatory actions proceed from the motive of duty.25 And once again, the father would
have had reason to concur. He had several grounds to grant the request
to hide the child from the Nazis, but among these there was no fear of
divine sanctions. He felt deep concern for the girl, and his wife liked her
at first sight. There were also great dangers involved for him, his wife and
his children. Nevertheless, he neither decided to accept the girl into his
house on the former grounds, nor decided to turn her away on the latter ground. He gave the girl shelter because he felt obligated. Taking her
in was what he took to be God's will, that is, what he took to be morally
required from him. 26
Thus a theistic metaphysic seems to be capable of providing the resources not only for an illuminating account of moral obligation,27 but
also for justifying and motivating a particular obligation's fulfilment in
a concrete case. Transparency can be maintained. Conversely, if a theistic
metaphysic is given up and replaced by a naturalist atheist metaphysic,28
this move cannot but have repercussions in the moral thought which was
supported by it. The transparency of a theory of overriding moral obligations becomes lost. And this, in my reconstruction, is what happened in
the case of Williams. He gradually turned into a metaphysical nahlralist.
The result was that the institution of morality with its inescapable and
sometimes costly obligations came for him to hang in mid-air. This should
not come as a surprise. For "what does broad reflective equilibrium demand if not that we bring morality into some congruence with whatever
else we hold in our going view of the world?"29
What about Alternatives
It may now be objected that one philosopher's progress from religious

scepticism to atheism, with a parallel development in ethical thought
from acceptance to denial of the possibility of there being objective, inescapable moral obligations- however plausible-is not sufficient for an argument establishing the incompatibility of metaphysical naturalism and
the reality of inescapable moral obligations. Moreover, even if a realist
theory of moral obligation might suitably be embedded in a theistic metaphysic, this does not prevent such a theory from being developed within
a metaphysical framework that is neutral towards theism and atheism.
Both objections cut ice. A satisfying reply, however, would exceed the limits of this paper. As far as the first point is concerned, a single observation
must do. The suggestion I made earlier, namely that there is a 'logical'
connection between metaphysical naturalism and the rejection of moral
realism, is strengthened by the fact that philosophers of a metaphysicalnaturalist persuasion tend to reject the relevant moral realism. 3D Here, in
addition to Mackie and Williams, I am thinking of philosophers such as
David Gauthier, Simon Blackburn, and Richard Joyce.
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Like Williams, Gauthier acknowledges, in an essay on Hobbes and
Locke, the essential conceptual role God can play in a morality of overriding obligations. His sympathies are with Locke because of the latter's
theocentrism which enables him to ground such a morality. Gauthier
agrees with Locke that "[t]he taking away of God ... dissolves all," that is
the elements of a strongly overriding morality. But he sides with Hobbes
because Locke's theocentrism is an answer to the question of the foundation of morality which "we no longer understand." 31 Hobbes' secular
morality is founded in advantage. Gauthier's moral thinking over the
years shows how he tries to make the best of Hobbes' fundamental idea. 32
Furthermore, those of us who have read Blackburn's Ruling Passions will
have noticed how uneasily-to understate the matter-a morality of inescapable obligations (and moral realism in general) sits with his metaphysical naturalism. 33 In this connection, though the issue is not central
to the moral realism I am dealing with, Blackburn's critique of Wiggins's
Sensible Subjectivism view is worth mentioning. Wiggins holds that value properties and sensibilities for perceiving them are made for each other. It is the latter half-sensibilities being made for the properties-that,
according to Blackburn, "really startles. Who or what makes them like
that? (God? As we have seen, no natural [evolutionary] story explains
how the ethical sensibilities of human beings were made for the ethical
properties of things, so perhaps it is a supernatural story.)"34 Blackburn
thus demonstrates not only his metaphysical-naturalist aversion to moral realism but also his recognition of the coherence of moral realism with
a theistic metaphysic. As to Joyce, thirdly, he argues in a recent study
that "[n]atural selection has provided us with a tendency to invest the
world with values that it does not contain, demands which it does not
make." Our being aware of this tendency threatens to undermine our
allegiance to a morality of binding obligations. Nevertheless, since it cannot be denied that such a morality is useful, we should be prepared to
make-believe acceptance of it. 35 Things seem clear enough. It is the same
old, naturalism inspired, projection theory that supports Joyce's moral
'fictionalism' as it did earlier Mackie's and Blackburn's varieties of moral
non-realism.
Let us now turn to the second objection. I will deal with it in some
greater detail by returning to Korsgaard and showing that she does not
succeed in what she set out to do in her Sources of Normativity; that is to
give-without having recourse to either a theistic or an atheistic metaphysic-a vindication of the idea that costly moral obligations are real and
inescapable. I take Korsgaard as my target because I consider her attempt
to establish such a vindication to be the best of its kind.

Korsgaard's Theory of Moral Obligation
According to Korsgaard, doubt about the reality of costly moral obligations is a live option, if not under the pressures of life's exigencies then
through developments in modern science and philosophy.36 The sceptical
normative question "Is there really anything I must do and, if so, why?"
is a reaction to commonplace confidence in moral norms and obligations.
This confidence finds its philosophical expression in a particular realist
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theory of value and obligation. The world in which we live has a normative dimension. It can be characterised as an ought-to-be-ness. Thus,
knowledge of the world can provide insight into what we have reason to
do. Korsgaard is critical of this position. Her main point is that this type of
moral realism presupposes confidence in normativity, that is, in the reality of moral norms and obligations. And this is exactly the problem for the
moral sceptic (pp. 37-41). The answer to the normative question is therefore not to be sought in an objective, external world of normative facts or
objective reasons, but in the subjective, internal world of one's own mind.
Reflection is the key to the sceptic's problem. Following the lead of Hume
and Williams, Korsgaard says:
Obligations and values are projections of our own moral sentiments
and dispositions. To say that these sentiments and dispositions are
justified is ... to say that they are good. We are the better for having
them .... But the normative question is one that arises in the heat
of action. It is as agents that we must do what we are obligated to
do, and it is as agents that we demand to know why. So it is not just
our dispositions, but rather the particular motives and impulses that
spring from them, that must seem to us to be normative .... Each
impulse as it offers itself to the will must pass a kind of test for normativity before we can adopt it as a reason for action. (p. 91)
The test is one of reflective endorsement. How does this test come about,
and when is it successful? At this point, Korsgaard's thinking takes a
decisive Kantian turn. From the deliberative perspective, motives or impulses-desires, in short-provide suggestions for action which we can
accept or reject. We can act on a particular desire if it can withstand reflective scrutiny, that is, if we can will it to be a law. This law is formal.
It is a categorical imperative with no definite content. But it is not Kant's
law of Reason. Unlike Kant's law, Korsgaard's does not transcend the
individual person. On the contrary, it is precisely the law of a single person with a particular identity. The identity concerned is a practical not
a theoretical one. Practical identity is to be understood as "a description
under which you value yourself" (p. 101). Since it is in different roles
and from different perspectives that a person finds her life to be worth
living and her actions to be worth undertaking, practical identity is a
kind of container concept. 37 It comprises a jumble of conceptions of the
person, for example, that of mother, friend, citizen of a particular country, etc. Now, while deliberating about on what desire to act, the thinking
self legislates for the acting self in the light of the several conceptions of
his identity. Can I act on this desire-can I will this as a law-being a
mother, or a friend, a citizen, etc.? If I can, I have a reason to act. On the
other hand, if I cannot, I have an obligation. As Korsgaard puts it: "An
obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of
identity" (p. 102). Note that obligation is dependent on value. My obligations spring from my complex identity, which in turn is derived from the
worth I find in my life, roles and projects. So value is the ultimate source
of obligation.
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This view of obligations is not without its problems. In the first place,
since my identity is complex, what I cannot do in one conception of myself-as a mother, say-I cannot leave undone in another conception of
myself, for example, as a friend. What must I do? The solution is that not
all parts of our identity are equally important to us. Some parts are easily
shed and should be shed when they are in conflict with a part that, in our
view, is more fundamental. Another problem-one that is more difficult
to solve and more important to my purposes-concerns the special status of moral obligations. Let us first turn to the question what Korsgaard
holds to be special about them. The key to answering this is a correct
understanding of the notion of moral identity. Whereas non-moral conceptions of the self can be more or less fundamental, and can more or
less easily be shed, a person's moral identity is the fundamental one and
cannot be shed. It is inescapable. The reason is that this particular identity is neither more or less local nor contingent. Unlike the other identities, moral identity is universal, at least in the "world we live in, the one
brought about by the Enlightenment." In this world, people are Kantian
Citizens of the Kingdom of Ends (pp. 117, 121-22). The necessity of moral
identity has to do with the value each person attaches to herself and, as a
Kantian Citizen, inevitably also to others (p. 132). Without this value, one
would not have other identities which, as we have seen, are based on it.
Why does valuing humanity in your own person imply valuing it in that
of others? Korsgaard's argument here hinges on the public, that is, the
shareable nature of reasons. She sees an analogy between the publicity of
reasons and that of linguistic meaning. Reasons can as well be shared as
can the meaning of words: "You can no more take the reasons of another
to be mere pressure than you can take the language of another to be mere
noise" (p. 143).
The inescapability of moral identity seems to suggest that moral obligations are also inescapable. Is it more than a suggestion? Korsgaard's
answer appears to be yes and no. Since we necessarily have a moral identity and having an identity implies having obligations, we inescapably
have moral obligations-things "we owe to each other," to use Thomas
Scanlon's apt phrase. But this does not mean that those moral obligations
should always win the day when in conflict with other obligations. They
are not inescapable in the sense that they necessarily override the latter.
As Korsgaard puts it, there is no "reason why the laws of the Kingdom
of Ends should have more force than the laws of a Kingdom of Two"
(p. 128). It is up to the person who is facing the conflicting requirements
to decide which of them is the more weighty. Moreover-and here she
acknowledges a debt to Nietzsche-"there are limits to the depth of obligation." Obligation, and not solely moral obligation, should not get out
of control. In order to accomplish this, "[m]aybe, a little distance [from
obligation] is all we need" (p. 160). There is a paradox here. Obligations
are bound up with the preservation of identity, that is, with the control
of self. The idea now is that self-control should not get out of control, in
order to prevent life from going to pieces under its burden. The solution is
that identity can be maintained even when, at times, control is eased and
obligation is not heeded.
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But now failure looms large for Korsgaard's project. What she set out
to do was give a convincing account of the reality and inescapability of
costly moral obligations. What we have discovered, however, is that moral
obligations are not inescapable after all. As to the reality of moral obligations, they are derived from and thus dependent on moral identity. How
real, in the sense of necessary and universal, is this identity? Its universality is relativised because it is claimed only for the Enlightenment world
in which we live. And the necessity of moral identity, being based on the
value of self and others, is questionable because one may have doubts if
not about one's own value, then surely about the necessary connection
between valuing humanity in your own person and valuing it in that of
others. I have no problems with Korsgaard's analogy, which she makes
in the course of her argument, between the shareability of reasons and
that of linguistic meaning. Practical reasons indeed can be shared. But
there is a big difference between sharing the reasons of another person in
the sense of understanding them, and sharing them in the sense of making them your own, that is, of investing them with authority. Korsgaard,
as we have seen, emphasises the point that a particular desire of mine
as such has no normative force. Before it can acquire the status of normative reason for me, it must first be reflectively endorsed by me. Now,
my desire having passed my test of reflective endorsement does not yet
mean that it has passed another person's test of reflective endorsement.
What is a normative reason for me is not automatically a normative reason for someone else, and the other way around. I think Korsgaard would
agree. She could qualify her position-as in fact she might have done-by
stressing not the actuality but the possibility of my normative reason being shared by another person?8 But that is still too weak a foundation
to support the putative necessary connection between the value of one's
own life and that of one's fellow human beings. So Korsgaard's argument
for the necessity of moral identity by establishing a necessary connection
between valuing humanity in your own person and valuing it in that of
others seems to fail. Moreover, even if we would grant its necessity, moral
identity is not very deep. We have seen that the reflective self is always
free to overrule the claims of his necessary moral identity with an appeal
to a contingent non-moral identity. How real, then, are moral obligations?
Their reality cannot surpass that of moral identity, from which they are
derived. This means that their reality is at best only local and superficial,
and questionable at that.
Thus it appears that, in Korsgaard's account, moral obligations are neither inescapable nor, in a strong sense, real. Her project seems to have
foundered. If we want it to succeed, we must try another tack. My proposal is to tum to a divine command theory of moral obligation, the contours
of which I drew in an earlier section.

A Strong Divine COlIzmand Theory of Moral Obligation
Here I shall just give a somewhat more detailed sketch of my thoughts
on a divine command theory (henceforth OCT), with an eye to the question how human rights claims might be theoretically strengthened. First
of all, I am not particularly interested in a weak OCT such that being
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commanded by God is sufficient for an action to be morally obligatory.
Thus, if God has commanded that we should not take innocent human
life then, on the weak theory, we have the moral obligation not to do so.
The weak theory does not preclude that the taking of innocent human life
is morally prohibited on grounds which have nothing to do with God's
wilI.39 But my argument so far has been precisely that such grounds are
hard to find. We should therefore opt for a more challenging version of
OCT that makes God's command not only sufficient, but also necessary
for there being a moral requirement. It might go something like this: for
all actions A and persons P, A is morally obligatory for P if and only if
God commands P to do A. Thus there is a symmetrical relation between
an action being commanded by God and its being morally obligatory. The
principle tells us both that being commanded by God is logically necessary and sufficient for being morally obligatory, and that being morally
obligatory is logically necessary and sufficient for being commanded by
God. But this position is not satisfactory for the divine command theorist.
A strong OCT should capture the idea that an action being commanded
by God somehow explains its being obligatory, rather than the other way
round. So I am happy to follow Philip Quinn in his attempt to unpack this
asymmetry in terms of metaphysical dependence: if it is morally obligatory that P do A at time t, then by commanding that P do A at t God brings
it about that it is morally obligatory that P do A at t. 40
Let me say here a few things on an important, but I think mistaken
point which Mark Murphy recently made regarding this causal" OCT,
as he calls it. The fact that, on the basis of this particular meta-ethical
theory, moral obligations are inextricably bound up with divine commands is, in Murphy's view, no ground for thinking that these commands themselves constitute reasons, if only partially, to perform any
act. He clarifies his view of the relation between divine commands and
moral obligations in this meta-ethical theory with an analogy: "It would
be no more appropriate for one to talk about God's command in one's
normative account of why one ought to keep promises than it would
be for one to talk about the complete evolutionary history of the pain
mechanism in providing a normative account of why one ought not to
inflict needless pain."41
The first thing to say is that meta-ethics and normative ethics cannot
be kept apart, not even in the case of an austere meta-ethical theory such
as the causal OCT. Normative ethics are developed from or imply metaethical positions. And, conversely, meta-ethical theories have implications
which bear on one's normative views. Secondly, and more importantly,
Murphy seems to be quite confident about there really being moral obligations in the world. I should be surprised to learn that this confidence is
unrelated to his theistic view of the world, as I was not surprised to discover the connection between Williams's tum to atheism and his becoming sceptical of the existence, or at least of the binding force of moral obligations. Reference to God and his will in answering the question why one
is obligated not to inflict needless pain is surely to the point in a time that is
sceptical of the reality and binding force of moral obligations, "if not under the pressure of life's exigencies then through developments in modem
science and philosophy," whereas reference to the complete evolutionary
1/
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history of the pain mechanism is completely beside the point as an answer
to the question why one should not inflict needless pain. This particular
history seems rather suited to explain away the obligation. Transparency
of one's normative ethical position requires that it is not separated from
one's meta-ethical background beliefs.
Now, having made this short digression, let us return to our strong
conception of OCT. What does and does not follow from it? The first thing
to note is that if God does not exist, there are no moral obligations and, by
implication, no moral rights. (As we have seen, Williams comes close to
this conclusion.) On the other hand, it is not a valid inference that, if God
does not exist, everything is permitted and a person is without restraints
in his dealings with his fellow human beings. What is true is that, in the
case of God's non-existence, there are no moral obligations and rights, and
morally everything is permitted. But that is a far cry from there being no
obligations and rights at all, with the result that absolutely everything is
permitted. One should not overlook the fact that the state and its laws
create legal obligations and legal rights. Furthermore, irrespective of the
truth of OCT, people are generally subject to feelings of moral obligation
and feel inclined to respect moral rights. It must be admitted, however,
that such feelings are liable to disappear when one no longer believes that
moral obligations and their correlative rights really exist. 42 Another reason, perhaps, for not being too worried about the practical effects of the
combined belief in OCT and God's non-existence is that there is an important alternative to a God-based morality system, viz. a system in which
not the deontic but the aretaic concepts have pride of place, that is, a virtue
ethics. Thus, even though there might be no moral rights implying moral
obligations to perform certain actions and to refrain from performing others, it might be wise, good or praiseworthy to perform the former, and
unwise, bad or contemptible to perform the latter.43
Secondly, because OCT is silent on the way the divine will is made
known, it does not follow from the theory that God's commands are exclusively mediated through Scripture or the Church. Since the theory has
the form of a logical equivalence, it is in principle possible to derive the
content of the commanding will of God, constituting moral obligations
and rights, from natural human knowledge of what is morally required
and of what can be morally claimed. This particular knowledge could be
acquired through a method of moral truth finding which is not necessarily
of a theological nature. 44
Then there is the classic quandary of what makes God's commands
authoritative-or, in other words, what makes his commanding will morally good-if it is granted that might does not make right. Now, if God is
represented as a liar and a cheat-as the gods were in traditional Greek
religious thought, with which Plato was familiar-there is a real problem.
And the problem is still with us if God is conceived as the demiurgecreator who, in his creation of the world, is bound by an independent
idea of the good. For, in the latter case, it is not God but the good that is
ultimately the ground of obligation. 45 However, God as worshipped in
the Christian tradition is not only almighty but also perfectly good, both
morally and non-morally. Note that God's moral goodness need not, and
should not, be construed as consisting in his practising what he preaches.
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God is under no obligation. He acts from his goodness. Nor should God's
overall goodness be taken to be derived from a source outside his nature.
God himself is the supreme standard of goodness. If we look upon God in
this manner, the problem we faced dissolves. 46
Now, it is not enough for the acceptability of a theory that questions
and objections to it can be answered (and many more could be raised). So
let me finally mention a few positive reasons for my support of a strong
OCT. The first is that, unlike Korsgaard's theory, OCT is able to account
not only for the reality but also for the inescapability of moral obligations.
Nobody can get off the hook of a particular costly moral obligation by reminding him- or herself, a la Korsgaard, of the limits of moral obligations
in general, and by taking distance from a particular one. For moral obligations are ultimately not self-imposed, as with Korsgaard, but divinely
imposed. Furthermore, OCT sits easily with the theocentric Christian tradition which has nurtured me religiously. Philosophically I see no ground
to turn my back on it. Last but not least, the theory enables us to ward off
a Rortyan sceptical attack on the reality of human rights. And here I have
come full circle to the point where I began this paper. So it is time to draw
a conclusion.

Conclusion
The principal question which I set out to answer was whether, since moral
rights and obligations stand or fall together, the latter can stand, that is,
whether they are real and inescapable. A first conclusion was that a morality of real, inescapable and-for the agent-sometimes costly obligations
and their correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic,
fits in badly with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion was that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project, which is
neutral towards theism and atheism, fails to give a satisfying account of
such obligations. My final claim was that a theistic account in terms of a
strong divine command theory succeeds where non-theistic and atheistic
accounts seem to founder.47
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